Sovereignty involves rights and duties among which the protection of one's fellow citizens is paramount.
Historically people have organized in territorially distinct and independent states to build up the power and security necessary for achieving their goals of prosperity and peace. When a government either fails to fulfill its mandate or malevolently turns against the people, they can overthrow it and install a government according to their will.
The contemporary globalized world and modern weaponry added an international twist to the above classic postulate. In the modern world a small group of people can terrorize a large population using advanced weapons and ruthless tactics. The international community can and does help people under the danger of extermination or other grave deprivations of human rights.
Public support and national interest, as perceived by governments, will make humanitarian intervention a likely and acceptable policy alternative, but the analysis will not be complete if we do not contemplate the possibility to avoid humanitarian intervention altogether or at least minimize the involvement as much as possible . Such an alternative seems even more tempting from the perspective if possible casualties and unavoidable material costs to both intervening and target countries. Politics as part of the universe are intolerant to power vacuum and the absence of a proper democratic institutions based on an economy driven by private property.1 Still it is tempting to avoid intervention to avoid risking life and treasure facing the uncertainty of success. While success military operation may be elusive and the costs unpredictable failure to act almost certainly lead to consequences that are even worse than a failed intervention. The examples of Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia where armed intervention to stop human suffering and restore civil society was withdrawn, insufficient or non existent have become fertile ground for terrorism and organized criminal activities including trafficking of people, arms and drugs and finding willing recruits among the desperate population.2 Alternative approaches to force and end to humanitarian abuses using persuasion, economic sanctions or arms embargoes rarely achieve anything as in the case of Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War, Slobodan Milosevic (who manged to destroy Yugoslavia) and Sudan's al Bashir.3 In general these attempts to avoid armed humanitarian intervention result in prolonging the suffering of the victims as in the case of Bosnia, directly causing hardship for the innocent as with the economic sanctions against Iraq after the Gulf War and being forced to intervene in the end as in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Even if there is a trend of among democratic governments and international public opinion towards favoring armed humanitarian intervention when the circumstances call for it that does not eliminate the need to explore the ethical and legal acceptability of coercive interference into other countries affairs. The post cold war theory has developed from attempts to justify humanitarian interventions under Chapter VII if the UN Charter through the report of the ICISS to the "2005 World Summit Outcome." United Nations General Assembly, 2005. confirming in its Articles 138 and 139 a refined Responsibility to Protect doctrine. It combines the theory of sovereignty as responsibility to protect with implied international responsibility to help a state fulfill that responsibility all the way to intervening with force and take charge if the state fails to protect its citizens. This justification of intervention is limited to four distinct cases of severe humanitarian abuses: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.4 The declared universal acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is due to the fact that it is based on established and widely accepted concepts as sovereignty as responsibility, just war, theory, the four Geneva conventions, the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide and the added crime of ethnic cleansing. The solid theoretical work done by the ICISS composed of leading authorities on the subject also contributed to that end. That declared acceptance though does not translate into more effective humanitarian action.
The alternative
Public support and national interest, as perceived by governments, may make humanitarian intervention a likely and acceptable policy alternative, but the analysis will not be complete if we do not contemplate the possibility to avoid humanitarian intervention altogether or at least minimize the involvement as much as possible . Such an alternative seems even more tempting from the perspective if possible casualties and unavoidable material costs to both intervening and target countries. Politics as part of the universe are intolerant to power vacuum and the absence of a proper democratic institutions based on an economy driven by private property.1 Still it is tempting to avoid intervention to avoid risking life and treasure facing the uncertainty of success. While success military operation may be elusive and the costs unpredictable failure to act almost certainly lead to consequences that are even worse than a failed intervention. The examples of Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia where armed intervention to stop human suffering and restore civil society was withdrawn, insufficient or non existent have become fertile ground for terrorism and organized criminal activities including trafficking of people, arms and drugs and finding willing recruits among the desperate population.2 Alternative approaches to force and end to humanitarian abuses using persuasion, economic sanctions or arms embargoes rarely achieve anything as in the case of Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War, Slobodan Milosevic (who manged to destroy Yugoslavia) and Sudan's al Bashir.3 In general these attempts to avoid armed humanitarian intervention result in prolonging the suffering of the victims as in the case of Bosnia, directly causing hardship for the innocent as with the economic sanctions against Iraq after the Gulf War and being forced to intervene in the end as in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Even if there is a trend of among democratic governments and international public opinion towards favoring armed humanitarian intervention when the circumstances call for it that does not eliminate the need to explore the ethical and legal acceptability of coercive interference into other countries affairs. The post cold war theory has developed from attempts to justify humanitarian interventions under Chapter VII if the UN Charter through the report of the ICISS to the "2005 World Summit Outcome." United Nations General Assembly, 2005. confirming in its Articles 138 and 139 a refined Responsibility to Protect doctrine. It combines the theory of sovereignty as responsibility to protect with implied international responsibility to help a state fulfill that responsibility all the way to intervening with force and take charge if the state fails to protect its citizens. This justification of intervention is limited to four distinct cases of severe humanitarian abuses: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.4 The declared universal acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is due to the fact that it is based on established and widely accepted concepts as sovereignty as responsibility, just war, theory, the four Geneva conventions, the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide and the added crime of ethnic cleansing. The solid theoretical work done by the ICISS composed of leading authorities on the subject also contributed to that end. That declared acceptance though does not translate into more effective humanitarian action.
How to define a successful intervention?
A simple and clear definition would be one that has achieved its aims with minimum casualties and maximum efficiency. There are several difficulties with attempting to apply this definition to real life cases. The first obvious one is with the aims of the intervention. It could be the stated goals in that case Somalia was a successful intervention as the US and UN forces helped distribute humanitarian aid. Many observers, analysts, experts and the general public do not agree with a positive assessment of the Somalia operation.5 Another approach would be to deduce an implicit goal for all humanitarian interventions as lasting peace which would involve state building. Assessing the efficiency of an armed intervention can be even more difficult than assessing the effectiveness. While obviously less causalities is better how can the level of acceptable casualties be defined? The Kosovo campaign with zero casualties for the intervening forces is a champion of effectiveness. On the other hand the intervention in Afghanistan is praised for the low level of troops involved and consequently low cost but the slow progress and mounting casualties will hardly make it a good example to follow. It comes back to the opening question:What is a successful intervention?
There are two well documented examples of armed intervention and subsequent policies which led to unsurpassed positive humanitarian results: Japan and Germany after WWII. Even if the war itself was of the classic aggressive, defensive type the mass atrocities committed by the Japanese and German armies made the Allied victory an humanitarian relief operation of epic proportions. Post WWII development also contributes to the concept that promoting economic development and democracy as the US did in Western Europe and Japan leads to a state of peace and stability in these regions. The Soviet block managed to provide for basic economic needs but the suppression of democracy led to an explosion of organized crime and corruption after the fall of communism. From another point of view the US intervention in Haiti stopped abuse and restored a semblance of democracy but failure to prompt democracy with economic development led to the predictable crumbling of the fragile democratic institutions.
To prevent the regrowth or metastasis of the root causes for intervention the need for state building including creating viable opportunities for sustainable economic development and reform in the most important spheres of public life as media freedom, law reform and the rebuilding of civil society.
In the case of Somalia, initially the United Nations Security Council resolution 794 (1992) authorizing UNITAF calls only for establishing of a secure environment for humanitarian operations. It can be argued that this limited objective prevented more decisive action towards disarmament of the marauding militias and ultimately undermined the success of the operation. Alternatively others argue that that the change of mission from humanitarian aid to nation building led to a decline of public support by pursuing an seemingly unattainable goal even before the tragic events in Mogadishu that triggered the withdrawal of US forces.8 Later with resolution 814 (1993) the UN Security Council raised the goals by including state building right when the newly created UNISOM II force lacked the number and resources to accomplish the task
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